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Eastern Germany in the Fifth Year 
Investment Hammering in the Basement?*
In this paper, the adjustment process of the eastern German economy is 
studied. Theoretical analysis of the transformation process suggests a J-curve 
of adjustment in production and in the capital stock and a u-curve of adjust­
ment in employment (Section I). The empirical data correspond to these 
hypotheses (Section II). A fascinating question is how the adjustment process 
will proceed in the future (Section III). Here, investment and the built-up of a 
new capital stock will play a crucial role. As in the Hicksian theory of the 
business cycle where autonomous investment hammering in the basement will 
eventually move an economy out of recession (Hicks 1950, p. 105) capital ac­
cumulation in eastern Germany must play the decisive role in the adjustment 
process. With investment coming along, the issue arises when economic policy 
for eastern Germany can return to normality (Section IV). Meanwhile, the 
economic shock that German unification caused to its European neighbors can 
be interpreted as a bygone (Sector V).
I. Transition as a Shock to a Socialist Economy
In the economics of transition, eastern Germany is a special case among the 
post-socialist economies. Monetary stabilization was achieved instantaneously 
by extending the currency area of the D-mark to eastern Germany in the 
monetary union of July 1, 1990. The institutional infrastructure was, in prin­
ciple, introduced with one stroke when eastern Germany joined western Ger­
many, according to Article 23 of the German constitution, on October 3, 
1990. Thus, the approach to transformation was a big bang: Of the three ma­
jor areas of economic reforms in the process of transformation (Siebert 
1994b), only the third major area of reform remained to be solved, namely, 
the real adjustment in the economy, especially in the previously state-owned 
firms. Here transfers from western Germany eased the transformation process 
so that the eastern German case can be interpreted as a big bang with the big 
brother (Siebert 1993c).
* Paper presented at the European University Institute in Florence, March 16, 1995. This 
paper is a sequel to my previous Kiel Discussion Papers: ‘The Economic Integration of Ger­
many” (No. 160, May 1990), “The Economic Integration of Germany -  An Update” (No. 
160a, September 1990), “Five Traps for German Economic Policy” (No. 185, April 1992), 
“The Big Bang with the Big Brother. German Unification in its Third Year” (No. 211, May 
1993), “German Unification and Its Impact on Net Savings” (No. 216, April 1993), and 
“Integrating the Eastern Lander. How Long a Transition?” (No. 229, April 1994). I appreciate 




























































































The transition from central planning to a market economy can be inter­
preted as a shock to the economic system. Whereas in eastern Germany an in­
stitutional void, characteristic for the transformation in Eastern Europe, was 
prevented, the economic environment was completely changed for the existing 
firms. In the tradeables sector they were exposed to international competition. 
In the nontradeables sector the splitting up of firms into smaller units implied 
that firms lost their monopolistic position. Moreover, a new price vector pre­
vailed to which firms had to adopt. As a rule, relative prices for tradeables 
goods fell, because of the intensification of competition, because of a redefini­
tion of scarcities and because of the abolition or reduction of subsidies. 
Whereas producer’s prices for tradeables products went down, prices for in­
puts, for instance, for foreign intermediate products, labor, energy and for the 
use of the environment increased. What is of particular importance is that 
firms had to bear the costs of financial capital that had previously been pro­
vided free of charge.
The competitiveness of a representative firm was not only determined by 
the pressures of decreasing product prices and increasing factor prices, but, 
additionally, by the product quality, to which the new competition also per­
tained. Thus, the transition to the market economy confronted firms with a 
completely different set of restrictions in their profit calculations -  they faced 
a real shock. The sudden change of the economic setting entailed a massive de­
valuation of the firms’ assets, which became partially or completely obsolete.1
Using the simplifying representation of the shock as an abrupt decrease of 
the producer's price and assuming a given technology and capital stock, it can 
be shown that the present value of profits, i.e. the value of the firm, will de­
crease (Van Long and Siebert 1992). For most eastern German firms, this 
shock has proven to imply negative profits; that is, without thorough restruc­
turing and an injection of new capital and new technology, most of the firms 
were not viable.
The above analysis suggests a typical adjustment path for the representative 
firm and -  aggregating over all the firms -  for the economy as a whole. The 
price shock leads to the devaluation of the existing capital stock. If the firm 
can sustain production at all (path i in Figure lb), investments will build up a 
new capital stock. Depending on the lags resulting from planning investment 
projects, from administrative procedures, and from construction, the increase 
in the capital stock will take time. That is, after the downward jump, the time 
profile will show a smooth increase in the new capital stock.
1 A similar, albeit less fundamental, devaluation of the capital stock had been observed as a 
consequence of the oil crises (Bemdt and Wood 1986). The unexpected increase of the 
oil price reduced the marginal efficiency of the existing capital stock, and part of the 
existing plants, which had been installed expecting the low energy prices of the past, 
became obsolete. Comparable processes relating to many factors of production 
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The time profile of production corresponds to the time profile of the capital 
stock. Output decreases in the investment phase and with the closing of firms. 
That is, both capital stock and production follow a J-shaped path, with an im­
mediate drop after the shock, and a gradual recovery (Figure lc). The drop in 
production will be accompanied by a drop in employment. The sudden reduc­
tion in the value of the capital stock will force a fall in employment, as the 
firm will become unable to earn the labor costs with the initial capital equip­
ment. Consequently, labor demand will be rapidly reduced, and will only in­
crease with investment, in most cases to a level lower than the original level, 
because the initial level of employment was distorted. Thus, a u-curve of em­
ployment corresponds to the J-curve of production, with the ultimate peak 
falling short of the initial employment level.
II. The Adjustment Process
In the following, adjustment in production, in employment and in the capital 
stock are discussed.
Adjustment in Production
The J-curve of the real adjustment process has different shapes for different 
young market economies. The most pervasive fall in production has been ob­
served in eastern Germany. There, the industrial production decreased to a 
third of its 1989 level in 1991 (Figure 2)2 whereas in Poland, in the Czech Re­
public and in Hungary the decline was much smaller. This is not surprising be­
cause eastern Germany did not have the exchange rate and the wage rate as 
shock absorbers.
Establishing private ownership of firms and real estate -  an important pre­
condition for adjustment to take place -  required time. Meanwhile the Treu- 
hand Agency has privatized the whole enterprise sector of the eastern German 
economy within four years with only 65 firms out of 13,800 still to be priva­
tized (December 1994). Only 20,000 employees of originally 4 million in the
2 The empirical measurement of the J-curve is fraught with considerable difficulties 
because production indices have been distorted. The transition implies a sizable change in 
the price system, and indices of production use the obsolete price weights of the pre- 
reform period. For instance, data on eastern Germany's industrial output were based on 
the 1985 price weights up to the end of 1990. Of course, quantities are themselves 
distorted because of false prices. As a result, the initial distortion of the output structure is 
transferred into the volume index. All this amounts to an overrepresentation of old, 
obsolete products and an underrepresentation of new, innovative output Moreover, 
statistics from the time of central planning may have been deliberately beautified, and 
gross and net values of production may have been falsely specified. Consequently, the 
drop of production as an immediate result of the adjustment shock may easily be 
exaggerated. A third statistical misrepresentation of production follows from the fact that 
























































































































































































Treuhand firms remain. In the restitution of private property, such as 
houses and lots, roughly 50 percent of the 2.3 million applications (out of 
which 2.1 million relating to houses and lots) have been resolved (end of 
1994). In the last two years, property rights problems were not an issue in the 
privatization of firms. But they are still relevant in the housing sector, and 
consequently for the development of the inner cities.
The adjustment process in eastern Germany is characterized by a relatively 
strong expansion of the nontradeables sector. In the production of local and 
regional goods the adjustment process is proceeding smoothly. This holds for 
construction and for the construction-related industries, for the crafts, and for 
the service sector. The contribution of these sectors to GDP is rising (Figure 
3).3 In the sector of nontradeables, the index for net production has surpassed 
the level of the second half of 1990 considerably (Table 1), for instance in 
structural metal products which are construction related (184.5 percent), metal 
products (136.9 percent), printing (145.4 percent) and in the construction 
industry (177.4 percent).
The reason why the nontradeables sector adjusted more quickly in eastern 
Germany is that nontradeables were not exposed to international competition 
in the product markets and that new firms could establish themselves with less 
difficulty. Moreover, local markets represented a nice target for direct in­
vestment from outside. In addition, a Dutch-disease phenomenon was superim­
posed on the adjustment process in the new Lander due to the transfers from 
western Germany to households (Siebert 1993a; Greiner et al. 1994). These 
transfers have stimulated consumption demand for nontradeables; the non­
tradeables sector has attracted capital and qualified labor and has driven up 
factor costs including wages in the tradeables sector. It should be noted, how­
ever, that not the whole gap between eastern German aggregate demand and 
GDP (in 1994 466.8 Mill. DM versus 255.9 Mill. DM in 1991 prices) is rele­
vant for the Dutch disease phenomenon since the trade deficit (of 210.9 Mill. 
DM in 1994) partly is the counterposition to external direct investment.
In the tradeables sector, however, especially in the capital goods sector, 
things do not look so bright. It has been extremely difficult for eastern Ger­
man firms to establish themselves in western German and international mar­
kets, to develop the right product for a market niche, and to break into exist­
ing relations between buyers and sellers. An export base is not yet clearly 
established.
3 Note that for reasons for comparability GDP in Figure 3 is in constant 1991 prices. Since 
in 1991 prices in eastern Germany were still partially distorted, Figure 3 does not fully 




























































































Figure 3 -  GDPa in eastern Germany by Sectors















GDP in the Producing Sector




























































































Table 1 -  Net Production3 of Production Industries in eastern Germany*5
N o te
IV  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994c W e ig h t for
ìggod
W e ig h tc ’e  
fo r  IV  93
Total production industries 97.4 77.2 78.7 86.9 101 .0 100 .0 100 .0
Energy 103.1 103.2 96.7 103 .2 108 .0 12.42 13.3
Mining 108.9 70.3 50.4 39.1 33.0 9.56 3.1
Total Manufacturing 94.1 66.1 64.3 70.1 84.2 59.95 50.0
Manufacture of basic goods 
of which:
92.3 75.9 78.5 85.5 110.6 11.51 12.6
Oil refineries 
Stone, sand, and clay
91.9 124.3 131.9 133.3 144.4 1.27 1.8
industries 76.2 62.1 96.6 136 .4 2 1 1 .3 2.51 5.3
Iron and steel industry 80.5 66.2 60.2 59.7 74.4 0.79 0.6
Foundries 90.2 55.5 42.6 36.4 44.7 1.07 0.5
Chemical industry 106 .2 78.1 65.8 57.6 68.3 4.04 2.7
Manufacture of capital goods 
of which:
Manufacture of structural
93.1 56.2 50.7 55.5 64.7 32.90 21.1
metal products 100.0 109.4 140.3 163.1 187.1 2.93 5.4
Mechanical engineering 92.2 51.6 32.6 31.8 32.2 15.24 4.9
Road vehicle construction* 91.8 49.1 54.9 83.6 113.2 2.71 3.0
Electrical engineering* 
Precision engineering,
92.7 47.7 47.8 50.0 61.3 8.51 5.2
optics, watches 116 .0 23.6 29.1 20.9 24.8 1.09 0.3
Metal products 
Manufacture of consumer
85.9 33.9 20.2 20.7 140.8 0.88 1.5
goods 
of which:
96.0 69.1 71.4 80.2 98.7 7.22 7.1
Wood processing 103.9 75.6 79.0 96.1 105.1 1.53 1.6
Printing 94.4 113.6 128.9 126.3 149.6 1.33 2.0
Textiles
Manufacture of food, bever-
90.9 43.0 32.1 31.0 37.1 1.69 0.6
ages, and tobacco 
of which:
99.6 90.7 94.3 99.6 114.7 8.32 9.4
Food and beverages 95.0 85,2 95.2 103.1 117.3 6 .90 8.0
Tobacco 120.2 115.4 90.8 83.9 103.1 1.42 1.4
Building industry 98.3 99.7 128.7 156.4 187.2 18.07 33.5
Building construction 96.7 104.2 123.3 148.1 187.9 8.79 16.4
Civil engineering 99.8 95.4 133.8 164 .2 186.5 9.28 17.1
aIndex of net production, adjusted by working days, 2nd half 1990=100. -  ^Including eastern
Berlin. -  cJan.-Nov. -  “Weight for second half of 1990. -  Calculated using the index of net
production adjusted by working days, multiplied by weights according to the index base. -  
^Including repair.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1993a, 1994b],
In 1994, the producing sector, which comprises energy, mining, manufac­
turing, and construction, actually has reached the production level of the sec­
ond half of 1990 (for more details see Table 1). The output index in manufac­


















































































































































































































































































capital goods industry, the output index only reached 64.7 percent of its origi­
nal level. In the electrical engineering industry, the output index was at 67.3 
percent. The mechanical engineering industry (32.2) and the optical industry 
(including precision engineering and watches) (24.8) had even lower output 
levels. These data clearly indicate a deindustrialization of the eastern German 
economy. The deindustrialization of eastern Germany, having at its root the 
inefficiency and obsoleteness of the capital stock inherited from the socialist 
planning system, was aggravated by the conversion rate of 1:1 between the 
ostmark and the D-mark, which represented an appreciation of the ostmark of 
about 400 percent, and by wage policy (see below).
Adjustment in Employment
There is still a large gap between labor productivity and wages in eastern 
Germany. In the third quarter of 1994, labor productivity (output per person 
employed (including self-employed)) was at 46 percent of the western German 
level when constant prices of 1991 are used and at 55.2 percent in current 
prices4 (Figure 4), gross wages (Bruttolohn- und Gehaltssumme) were at 78.4 
percent. Nominal wages in eastern Germany were at roughly 84 percent of the 
western German level at the end of 1994 (although the working hours in east­
ern Germany are longer and the vacation is shorter). Construction-related 
sectors and some sectors in eastern Berlin reached the western German wage 
level. Most sectors were in the upper 80 percent range, such as construction 
(90 percent), banking (88.5 percent) and insurance, but also retail trade and 
government (84 percent). Even the sectors with tremendous economic diffi­
culties, the metal and electrical engineering industries and iron and steel paid 
more than 80 percent. In the eastern German economy unit labor costs reached 
130 percent of the western German level in 1994, indicating that this region is 
still not competitive in terms of labor costs (Sachverstandigenrat 1994, p. 
113). Labor’s share in national income (including calculated entrepreneurial 
wages) -  which was 78.5 percent in western Germany -  amounted to 97 per­
cent in 1994 [Sachverstandigenrat 1994, p. 114],
Adjustment in the labor market shows part of the expected u-curve (Figure 
5). Employment in the eastern German economy excluding labor-market 
schemes had already a turning point in 1991; employment (including short- 
time workers and governmental employment schemes) had its turning point in 
1994. Whereas the number of persons in explicit labor market schemes (ABM)
4 Comparisons of economic data of eastern and western Germany are confronted with a 
dilemma. For an analysis of a development over time, for instance of productivity, one 
wants to exclude price effects and consequently uses constant prices. In the official 
statistics, 1991 prices are applied. Unfortunately, prices were still distorted in eastern 
Germany in 1991 so that the data for following years are also distorted. Therefore, if one 
is not interested developments of the past but in determing the actual relative position of 





























































































has not been reduced drastically, short-time work arrangements (which once 
amounted to 2 million) have been cut down considerably.
Figure 4 -  Eastern and western German Wages and Productivity Ratios3
Western Germany = 100


































































































1990 1 991 1 992 1 993 1 9 9 4
1 Fourth quarter 1989. — b For instance, early retirement, hidden reserve. 




























































































Adjustment of the Capital Stock
It will be a fascinating querry for economic historians to what extent the 
capital stock of eastern Germany has become obsolete in the moment when the 
new economic system started. It is extremely difficult to specify what the mar­
ket value of the existing capital stock was for the old and for the new price 
vector prior and after German unification. In this question, the capital stock of 
infrastructure, housing and enterprises in the tradeables and non-tradeables 
sector must be distinguished. It can be expected that the capital stock of the 
tradeables sector had an extremely low value and that it will require a rela­
tively high investment. An extremely crude approach would be to use the east­
ern German productivity in relation to western Germany as a proxy for the 
value of the eastern German capital stock. Productivity (and the value of the 
capital stock) were estimated very early in the transformation process at one 
third of the western German level (Siebert 1990) coming close to the produc­
tivity per capita of 27 percent which was enventually measured statistically for 
the fourth quarter of 1990. This implies that more than 70 percent of the capi­
tal stock of eastern Germany would have to be written off.
Alternatively, one would have to scrutinize the vector of capital goods and 
to evaluate which specific capital goods should be deleted from the capital in­
ventory. This would be equivalent to an immediate write-off of 100 percent. 
Besides this category of capital goods with a value of zero in 1990, a second 
category of capital goods could still be used, but only partly, so that its value 
has to be scaled down instantaneously to a considerable extent. The remaining 
value would have to be written off over some years. A third category may be 
written off with a more less normal rate of depreciation.
Capital requirements of eastern Germany can be estimated by a very simple 
formula (Siebert 1993c). It is assumed that eastern Germany will have the 
same capital stock per capita as western Germany after the transformation 
process eventually will have ended; the western German capital stock is as­
sumed to grow with 2.5 percent. Considering a fifteen-year period of adjust­
ment, the capital stock of the enterprise sector in eastern Germany would be 
DM 1,750 billion in the year 2005. This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation 
for accumulated investment which assumes that the existing capital stock is 
completely obsolete. Assuming that one-third of the capital stock is usable, and 
considering again a fifteen-year period of adjustment, a rough calculation 
shows that the enterprise sector would need private investment of DM 80 bil­
lion in each year. Using the infrastructure of western Germany as a frame of 
reference, infrastructure capital in eastern Germany would amount to DM 730 
billion after adjustment. This figure includes public buildings and equipment, 
roads, railroads, postal and communications infrastructure, and waterways. 
Under the assumption that one third of the capital stock can be used, public in­
vestment of DM 50 billion per year would be needed. Of course, recreating 




























































































not include the housing sector which will again require more time for rebuild­
ing (Table 2).
Table 2 -  Capital Stock and Investment in eastern Germany and western 
Germany, bill. DM
Western Germany EasternGermany
Eastern German capital 
stock after adjustmentb
1990 2005a 1988 1990 2005
1. Gross domestic product
Total 2,426 346




construction, electricity, gas, 








Goods-producing sectors 136 46
Housing
3. Gross capital stock
124 12d
Total 1 l,663e 16,891 l,635e 2,916 4,223
Enterprises (without housing) 4,815d-e 6,974 l,300f 1,204 1,743
Goods-producing sectors 2,056d>e 2,977 780e 514 744
Housing 4,635d-e 6,712 - 1,159 1,678
For information: Public 
infrastructure
2,01 IS 2,913 503 728
4. Capital-output ratio
Total 4.8 5.2
Enterprises (without housing) 2.5 -
Goods-producing sectors 2.2 3.9
aAssuming a growth rate of the western German capital stock of 2.5 percent. -  ^Calculated as 
25 percent of the west German capital stock in 2005. -  including goods-producing crafts. -  
dNew construction and modernization. -  Evaluated at replacement costs; yearly averages; 
excluding roads, waterways and underground workings (offentlicher Tiefbau), including rail 
and postal services. -  ^Capital stock at 1986 prices. -  Slncluding roads, waterways, sewage 
systems, and rail and telecommunications systems; for 1988.
Source: Data for 1990 and 1988 Siebert 1993.
Investment will be the decisive variable for the growth process in eastern 
Germany. It increased from DM 92,1 billion in 1991 to DM 157 billion in
1994 (in 1991 prices). It is estimated that 180 bill. DM will be invested in
1995 (all figures in 1991 prices) (Table 3). Investment in the enterprise sector 
including housing, railroads, postal services and telecommunications accounted 
for the larger part of total investment, roughly for 85 percent. In 1994, 























































































































































































Investment is heavily concentrated in buildings, only one third of the 
investment outlays are in equipment. In the enterprise sector (94.5 bill. DM in 
1993), the bulk of investment outlays goes to retail and transportation (35.3 
bill. DM) and services (10.6 bill. DM) as well as mining (10.9 bill. DM); 
manufacturing accounts for 27.3 bill. DM (Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschafts- 
forschung and Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, 1995, Table 1).
Table 3 -  Gross Investment in eastern Germany (billions of Deutsche marks)3




Total 34.4C 92.1 117.7 134.2 157.0 180 680
Equipment 41.8 45.6 48.4 53.0 57.7 246
Buildings 50.3 72.1 85.4 104.0 122.5 433.8
Enterprise sector
(including housing) 77.6 97.3 113.1 132.5
Government 14.5 20.3 21.1 24.5
aIn 1991 prices; including railroads, postal services, and telecommunications. -  ^Estimate. -  
cHalf of 1990 in current 1990 prices.
Source: Sachverstandigenrat [1994, Tables 10, 43], Statistisches Bundesamt 
[1994c],
Calculations of the eastern German capital stock are still preliminary. In the 
year 1991 and 1992 the statistical scrapping of capital goods exceeded the ren­
ovations. It is estimated that in 1994 accruals are larger than scrapings by 2 to 
1 (Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung and Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft 
1995). The capital stock in eastern Germany still is small relative to the west­
ern German capital stock amounting to one tenth of the German capital stock 
whereas it should account for one fifth if population size is used (Table 4).
Table 4 -  Gross Capital Stock and in eastern and western Germany, enterprise 
sector,3 1991-1994
Eastern Germany Western Germany
1991 | 1994 1991 I 1994
Gross capital stockb (bill. DM)
Potential capital productivity0 (DM) 
Production potential (bill. DM)
3Without housing. -  bln 1991 prices. -  cProc 
averages).
478 526 5,254 5,733 
0.57 0.50 0.42 0.42 
270 262 2,180 2,395 
luction potential to gross capital stock (yearly
Source: Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung und Institut fiir Weltwirt­




























































































III. Speculating on the Catching Up Process
The Barro rule postulates that income differences between regions and be­
tween countries are reduced with a relatively low rate of 2 percent. This iron 
law of catching up is based on an empirical cross-region and cross-country 
analysis of catching-up-processes in industrial and industrializing countries 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1992). According to these studies, it takes 
decades to close a growth gap.5 For instance, eastern Germany would need 22 
years to halve the difference in income per capita and attain 74 percent of the 
western German level (Table 5).
In order to forecast the catching up process one would need a complex 
model of the supply side of the eastern German economy with a macroeco­
nomic production function and with submodels explaining the aggregate 
demand of firms for capital and labor and a submodel on technical progress. 
Quite a few variables would have to be considered exogenously such as the 
level of transfers from western Germany, the built-up-of infrastructure, and 
the wage path, among others.
In evaluating potential scenarios of the adjustment process in such a context 
it is important to distinguish between different types of capital since the time 
required to rebuilt the capital stock will differ for them. Capital in the non- 
tradeables sector has been installed very quickly. A large part of this capital 
stock is already in place. However, in the tradeables sector, this will take a 
much longer time. Part of this investment, for instance, direct investment of 
western German and newly founded eastern German firms, has been under­
taken where profit opportunities are expected; this type of investment will be 
associated with a negative cash flow initially -  a cash-sink hole -  which can be
5 The convergence rate, i.e. the rate with which the distance between the per capita income 
of two countries is reduced, is equal to the difference in real growth rates. Using the 
same notations as in equations 1 and 2 and letting B denote population size, the relative 
income position in period t, yt, is defined as
(i)
































































































incurred because of high expected profits in the future. Other investments will 
have to be financed through retained earnings requiring that profits are made.
Table 5 -  Catching-up in eastern Germany under Alternative Growth Differ- 
entialsa (percent)
Growth differential (percentage points)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1994 47.88 47.88 47.88 47.88 47.88 47.88 47.88 47.88 47.88
1995 48.84 49.33 49.8.3 50.33 50.84 51.35 51.86 52.38 52.91
1996 49.83 50.84 51.86 52.91 53.98 55.07 56.18 57.32 58.47
1997 50.84 52.38 53.98 55.62 57.32 59.06 60.86 62.71 64.62
1998 51.86 53.98 56.18 58.47 60.86 63.35 65.93 68.62 71.42
1999 52.91 55.62 58.47 61.47 64.62 67.94 71.42 75.08 78.93
2000 53.98 57.32 60.86 64.62 68.62 72.86 77.37 82.15 87.23
2001 55.07 59.06 63.35 67.94 72.86 78.15 83.81
2002 56.18 60.86 65.93 71.42 77.37 83.81 (5.70) (5.13)
2003 57.32 62.71 68.62 75.08 82.15 (6.42)
2004 58.47 64.62 71.42 78.93 (7.33)
2005 59.66 66.59 74.34 82.98 (8.56)
2006 60.86 68.62 77.37
2007 62.09 70.71 80.53 (10.7)
2008 63.35 72.86













aThe figures in parentheses show the number of years needed to reach 80 percent of western
Germany’s level 1994 GDP in current prices as starting values. Population ratio 0,239.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1994b]; own calculations.
This type of investment will only come about over time. Financing invest­
ment through retained earnings is especially relevant for the newly founded 
small firms that must be at the heart of a Schumpeterian growth process of 
firms in eastern Germany. The bulk of infrastructure (roads, telecommuni­
cations) will be created quickly, but mega-projects, such as a new airport for 
Berlin, may only be started at the end of the first decade of the next century or 
later and would need another ten years to be completed. Also new transporta­
tion axes require time. Interpreting the spatial structure as a stock variable, 
adjustment will depend on such mega-projects. Finally, rebuilding the housing 




























































































Another aspect of the potential scenarios is what level of adjustment is 
aimed at. It would not be correct to go for the 100-percent solution, because 
gross domestic product per head varies considerably from region to region in 
western Germany. Some Lander in western Germany only reach a good 80 
percent of the western German average. Thus, it makes sense to consider a 
situation where eastern Germany eventually reaches 80 percent of the western 
German level of GDP per capita.
So far, the catching-up process that has taken place is not negligible. GDP 
per capita (in current prices) rose from 31 percent of the western German 
level in 1991 to 47.9 percent in 1994 (38.5 percent in 1992, 44.8 in 1993). 
This implies a convergence rate of roughly 6-7 percent per year which is by 
far higher than the Barro rule of 2 percent.
A simple formula tells us how much time is needed for eastern Germany to 
catch up. Let Y9E and F94 be the initial GDP in western and eastern Germany, 
let a be the level to be reached, let B indicate the size of the eastern German 
population relative to western Germany, and let r ^  and rE denote the real 
growth rates, then
aP  P 9 4  etr* =  K 9 4  e'rC 
and thus
ln(YE/ Y w) - l n a p
For a given starting level of GDP in both parts of Germany, the time 
needed for catching up depends on the difference in the real growth rates 
between eastern and western Germany. If the difference in growth rates 
between east and west were only 2 percent, it would take 26 years to reach an 
adjustment of 80 percent. With a 3-percent differential, the catching up would 
require 17 years (13 years with a 4-percent differential). Table 5 illustrates 
the potential paths of catching up under different growth differentials between 
eastern and western Germany. GDP in current 1994 prices has been used as a 
starting point.
Figure 6 shows the closing of the growth gap when alternative growth dif­
ferences prevail between eastern and western Germany. It has been assumed 
that western Germany will grow at a potential rate of 2.5 percent. The eastern 
German growth potential has been estimated by correcting the western Ger­
man growth potential for the size of eastern German population. For the 
period 1990-1994, actual GDP data have been transformed into 1994 prices in 






























































































percent, eastern Germany would reach 80 percent of the western German level 
in GDP per capita in 2004; if the difference were 10 percent, the catching-up 
would occur in the year 2000. Figure 6 also illustrates the valley of the J- 
curve in the transformation of a socialist economy which is a reflection of the 





















































































































































































































































































In the analysis of the adjustment process it does not make sense to exclude 
west Berlin since it is geographically and economically part of eastern Ger­
many. Including west Berlin in the eastern German region means that eastern 
Germany starts at 53.6 percent of the west German level in 1993 -  date for 
1994 are not yet available. The target of 80 percent can then be reached 
roughly two years earlier (Figure 7; Appendix Al).
Of course, such mechanistic calculations should not be overestimated. It is 
realistic to expect that the time profile of investment will not be stretched 
evenly over the years. There are some reasons that it may be bell-shaped with 
the greatest momentum in the period 1994-1996 implying higher growth rates 
of GDP in these years or shortly after. It also should be noted that the growth 
in the process of catching-up will become smaller over time (Barro and Sala-1- 
Martin) since the economy moves down the marginal productivity curve of 




























































































IV. Returning to Normality in Economic Policy
German unification can be interpreted as a massive structural change or as 
an economic shock to Germany as a whole. The shock has created a temporary 
excess supply of labor and a temporary excess demand for capital to rebuild 
eastern Germany, both in public infrastructure and in the enterprise sector. 
Such a structural change requires a shift in relative factor prices, which 
implies that the relative position of labor has become less favorable. It also 
implies a relocation of private capital from western to eastern Germany in the 
transition period. And it mandates governmental transfers for financing 
investments in infrastructure, for subsidies to industry in eastern Germany and 
as transfers to households (unemployment insurance, retirement), thus repre­
senting a shock to the German macro economic policy mix between fiscal pol­
icy, wage policy and monetary policy.
The need to finance annual public transfers amounting to 5 percent of GDP 
has changed the structural characteristics of western Germany. The budget 
deficit in 1994 was 3.8 percent of GDP including the federal level, the Lander, 
the municipalities, the Treuhand and the social security system. Government 
debt has doubled within five years, climbing from 41 percent to 60 percent of 
GDP. The tax burden has been increased; and the government share in GDP 
has risen from 45 to 50 percent. Germany has become a little less of a market 
economy and a little more of a state economy. The government’s increased 
demand for resources has created a severe burden for the private sector, indi­
cating that the long-term environment for economic growth in western Ger­
many has become less favorable. The potential growth rate of western Ger­
many has been reduced for the interim period; it is now estimated at 2 percent 
instead of 3 percent for the period from 1993 to 1995. The growth rate of the 
capital stock is below its long-run average. The recession in 1993 (Figure 8) is 
partly home made and has been caused by Germany attempting to find a new 
policy mix.
This situation can only be improved if fiscal policymakers succeed in con­
solidating the budget situation, in reducing the budget deficit relative to GDP, 
and in bringing down the tax burden over the coming years. In the medium 
and in the long run, this question will be influenced by how quickly eastern 
Germany will catch up. This will determine the extent of transfers needed and, 
consequently, Germany’s fiscal policy stance, which, in turn, will determine 
the economic conditions for wage policy and for monetary policy and which 
influence the growth potential in western Germany via taxation. Thus, the 



























































































Figure 8 -  Gross Domestic Product3 in eastern and western Germany, 1990- 
1994 (change in percent)




























































































Germany’s fiscal federal system has the principal merit of allowing a decen­
tralization of political decision making and of giving room to regional prefer­
ences, but this same system makes a reorientation of fiscal policy in western 
Germany rather difficult. The Lander and municipalities in the west have 
larger expenditures than the federal government, but the larger part of the 
burden of adjustment arising from German reunification has been put on the 
federal government. The Lander and the municipalities in the west have taken 
only a smaller share in expenditure cuts than the federal government. This is a 
structural reason why, on the whole, fiscal policy has not reacted with suffi­
cient expenditure cuts or caps on expenditure increases. The federal govern­
ment therefore took refuge to resort to tax increases. With the given allocation 
of tax revenues and burden sharing between the federal government and the 
Lander, it can be expected that the Lander will increase their expenditure in 
the upswing not contributing to the necessary reduction of government 
spending.
Governmental transfers to eastern Germany will have to be reduced over 
time, both in relation to GDP and in absolute terms. Unfortunately, it is not 
easy to calculate net transfers for a number of reasons: In an integrated eco­
nomic area it is extremely difficult to determine what part of non-area specific 
spending of the federal government should be attributed to eastern Germany. 
General outlays are statistically allocated to eastern Germany in proportion to 
population. A similar problem holds to some extent for public investment. In 
addition, it becomes more and more difficult to determine trade flows in an 
integrated economy and to delineate private investment activity in both parts 
of the country. An indicator of transfers is the wedge between aggregate 
demand and aggregate production or the trade account. With 65 percent of 
GDP the deficit in the trade and service account still is extremely high. The 
trade deficit indicates the gap between production and absorption. From the 
macroeconomic accouting identity we have
Y = C + I + G + X - M (3)
where Y denotes GDP, C private consumption, I gross investment, G govern­
ment spending, X exports and M imports. Let A stand for absorption with 
A = C + I + G and let Ac be consumptive absorption with Ac = C + G. 
Then, we have







































































































/  Net trade deficit6
Gross Investment
1 9 9 0 c 1 991 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 d
0 In 1991 prices. -  b Plus net external factor income. -  c 2nd half 




























































































Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product and 
Total Domestic Demand in Eastern Germamy 1994
By kind of activity By kind of expenditures
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There is still an excess of consumptive absorption over production in east­
ern Germany; it amounted to 12 percent in 1994, but the gap is becoming 
smaller over time (Table 6). Instead of GDP, one could consider GNP data in 
equation 4 which include net external factor income of eastern German factors 
of production, mostly income of communities to western German. In Figure 9, 
gross investment and the net trade deficit plus external factor income in per­
centage of GDP are illustrated. Whereas the net trade deficit relative to GDP 
is falling, gross investment relative to GDP is rising. This indicates that con­
sumptive absorption is being reduced over time in constant 1991 prices.6 Con­
sumptive absorption still exceeds production. Eastern Germany is not able to 
produce enough for its own consumption. Consumption in eastern Germany is 
financed by funds from “abroad”.















1991 206.0 -267 .3 -91 -152.3 8.0 114.6 29.7
1992 262.6 -328 .4 -128 .9 -194.8 10.8 131.9 52.1
1993 305.4 -357.8 -154.3 -206.7 9.4 134.6 62.7
1994 340.6 -381.3 -181 .6 -221.8 3.7 59.3C 43.4C
aPrivate Consumption plus governm ent spending excluding governm ental investm ent; 
Source: Statistical office, erste Ergebnisse der Inlandsproduktsberechnung 1994. -  ^National 
Income Accounting Concept; Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 1994. -  cFirst half 
o f 1994.
Another approach to the external position of eastern Germany is to look at 
the external budget constraint of eastern Germany. Rearranging equation 3 we 
have
S - I + (T - G) = N + Se + YEX + Tr = CA (5>
where S denotes savings, I investment (plus change of inventories), T tax rev­
enues of government, N trade account, Se service account, YEX net external 
factor income, Tr unilateral transfers and CA the current account. Splitting up 
savings into savings of households (SH) and of the enterprise sector (SE) and 
splitting up investment into private (IE) and public investment (IG), we have 
for 1993 data
Sp + SE — IE — le + (T — G) = N + Se + YEX + Tr = CA 
33.6 + 57.3 -  130.3 -  24.0 + (302.0 -  301.4) = -  176.9 -  29.8 + 9.4 + 134.6= 
-  62.7 (6)
6 As in other comparisons, the statement depends on whether constant or current prices are 




























































































Savings are not sufficient to finance investment. Investment is also financed 
by a negative current account of 62.7 bill. DM. This figure indicates private 
capital inflows. External funds flowing to eastern Germany include unilateral 
transfers to eastern Germany of 134.6 mill. DM so that total inflows account 
for 197.3 bill. DM. Note that unilateral transfers enter into revenues of the 
sector .government in eastern Germany" which in equation 6 includes the 
social security system (unemployment, health and old age insurance).
Rearranging equation 5 we have with 1994 data in brackets 
1= -  N -  Se -  Tr + S + (T -  G)
(167.5) = (210.9)-43.4 (7)
where 43.4 bill. DM stand for the term -  Se -  Tr + S + (T -  G). This is 
yet another way of expressing that the net trade and service balance does not 
have a counterposition in investment. Taking into account that T -  G = Sc is 
savings of the government sector, equation (7) says that savings (of the private 
and the government sector) do not cover the deficit in the service account and 
unilateral transfers.
V. Fading Impact to Germany’s European Neighbors
German unification was not only a shock to Germany, but also to its Euro­
pean neighbors pushing up demand for goods by a strong German import 
demand (raising exports to Germany in some European countries by 20 per­
cent) and stimulating economic growth by at least half a percentage point in 
the European Union. The new frontier opening up in eastern Germany also 
was reflected in a higher rate of return for capital and higher real interest 
rates suppressing aggregate domestic demand in the partner countries. Thus, it 
was an asymmetric shock to the European Monetary System and putting pres­
sure on some currencies. This eventually let to its collapse in 1992 and 1993 
(Siebert 1993c). The bulk of the repercussions could have been circumvented 
by an appreciation of the D-Mark in 1990 or 1991, allowing other countries a 
lower interest rate. Moreover, the recession in Europe in 1993 could have 
been softened considerably. But such a realignment was not politically accept­
able. In the long run, eastern Germany will represent a growth region in the 
European Union and will be an albeit small growth stimulus from the supply 





























































































Table Al -  Catching-up in eastern Germany under Alternative Growth Dif­
ferentials3 including west Berlin (percent)
Growth differential (percentage points)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1993 53.58 53.58 53.58 53.58 53.58 53.58 53.58 53.58 53.58
1994 54.66 55.21 55.76 56.32 56.89 57.46 58.04 58.62 59.21
1995 55.76 56.89 58.04 59.21 60.41 61.63 62.87 64.14 65.44
1996 56.89 58.62 60.41 62.25 64.14 66.10 68.11 70.18 72.32
1997 58.04 60.41 62.87 65.44 68.11 70.89 73.78 76.79 79.93
1998 59.21 62.25 65.44 68.79 72.32 76.03 79.93 84.02 88.33
1999 60.41 64.14 68.11 72.32 76.79 81.54 86.58
2000 61.63 66.10 70.89 76.03 81.54 4.45 4.01
2001 62.87 68.11 73.78 79.93 5.73 5.01
2002 64.14 70.18 76.79 84.02 6.68
2003 65.44 72.32 79.93
2004 66.76 74.52 83.19 8.02
2005 68.11 76.79










aThe figures in parentheses show the number o f years needed to reach 80 percent o f western 
G erm any’s level. W est Berlin is taken as part o f eastern Germany, not western Germany. 
1993 GDP in current prices as starting values. Population ratio 0,239.______________________
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